Episode 01 · 29 minutes
Good to Great
by Jim Collins, 2001
Level Five leadership, the right people on the bus, the Stockdale Paradox, the hedgehog, and the flywheel. Then what happened to Circuit City, Fannie Mae, and Wells Fargo, and why the framework is hard to falsify. For neurodivergent leaders: quiet leadership over performance, seats shaped to the person, and a flywheel that keeps turning on a bad day.
The argument,
and the pushback
The argument is the author's, stated at full strength. The three readings below are Stoar's, lifted from what the episode says on air. Logan Williamson, LPC, approves every script.
- What the book argues
- Companies that make a lasting leap are not transformed by a charismatic outsider. They get there under modest, relentless leaders who put the right people in before deciding where to drive, face unwelcome facts out loud, settle on the one thing they can be best in the world at, and then push in that same direction for years until the momentum carries its own weight.
- Where it holds up
- Several of the seven ideas are sound instructions whatever the research behind them says: hire before you decide the destination, run autopsies without blame, keep a list of what you will not do, and ask whether a new technology serves the one thing you are best at rather than the other way round. Weigh the book as practitioner literature, a well organized checklist of things that plausibly help, and not a proven causal law.
- What we would push back on
- Collins picked eleven companies because their stock had already soared, then went looking for what they had in common, which is choosing the winners first and calling the shared traits a cause. Phil Rosenzweig's The Halo Effect, 2007, adds that the interviews and press coverage underneath the findings were produced by people who already knew the companies were winning. The list has not aged well either. Circuit City went bankrupt in 2008 and liquidated the next year, Fannie Mae entered federal conservatorship in September 2008, and Wells Fargo, held up in the book for its discipline, was found in 2016 to have opened millions of accounts its customers never asked for. Collins answers that those firms stopped practicing the principles, which leaves a model nothing can disprove: success proves it, and failure proves it was abandoned.
- If you or your team think differently
- Taken as a manual rather than a history it earns its place for a leader whose attention varies. The Hedgehog Concept becomes a thirty second test for saying no to the next exciting thing, and the Flywheel is an argument for putting the cadence in other people's hands so the company does not run on one person's good weeks. Level Five Leadership also describes a quiet, determined executive who never performs confidence, which is how a number of autistic leaders come to be read as unqualified.
- Running time 28:41
- Published 2026-09-01
- Topics Leadership, Strategy, Hiring and teams
- Reader Nora
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Transcript
The whole episode in text, 132 lines. Miles and Nora are synthetic voices reading a script approved by Logan Williamson, LPC.
Read the full transcript
Miles: It's nineteen seventy one. A tired paper company in Wisconsin has just handed the keys to its in house lawyer. Within weeks, doctors will tell him he's dying. What he does next is the reason a business book sold millions of copies, and the reason a lot of chief executives still talk in its vocabulary thirty years later.
Miles: Today: Good to Great, by Jim Collins. What it says, where it's wrong, and what it means when the leader, or the team, is neurodivergent.
Miles: Sixty Books. Presented by Stoar Consulting and Coaching.
Miles: From the reading room, this is Sixty Books. I'm Miles. Sixty of the best management books of the last hundred years, one per episode, read for leaders and teams who think differently, and for work where AI is now part of the job. Nora's here with the research.
Miles: Nora, you read this one with the highlighter out.
Nora: I did. And I want to start where Collins starts, which is with a man nobody expected anything from.
Miles: Set the scene for me.
Nora: So, nineteen seventy one. Kimberly Clark is a paper company. Coated paper, mostly. And it isn't a good one. Its stock has trailed the general market for twenty years. It's the kind of company that's fine. It isn't going anywhere.
Miles: Right.
Nora: And the board has to pick a new chief executive. They pick Darwin Smith. Smith is the company's in house lawyer. He's mild mannered. He grew up on a farm in Indiana and worked his way through school. If you were casting a movie about a great CEO, you wouldn't cast Darwin Smith.
Miles: Fair enough.
Miles: What did the board think of him?
Nora: Collins tells this story where one of the directors takes Smith aside, right after the appointment, and tells him he's not sure Smith has all the qualifications for the job.
Miles: To his face.
Nora: Yeah. To his face. And then, two months in, Smith gets diagnosed with nose and throat cancer. His doctors give him less than a year.
Miles: Huh.
Nora: And here's the first thing that tells you who this man is. He goes to the board and tells them he has no plans to die anytime soon. And he keeps working. He commutes every week from Wisconsin to Houston for radiation. And he lives another twenty five years.
Miles: So he's running a mediocre paper company while getting radiation treatment.
Nora: Yeah. While getting radiation. And somewhere in there he reaches the decision that the whole book hangs on. He looks at the core business, coated paper, and he concludes the company will never be great at it. Where it could be great is in consumer paper products. Kleenex. Huggies. Brands people buy every week.
Miles: Which means going up against.
Nora: Procter and Gamble. Head to head. And to do it, he sells the mills. He sells the paper mills. Including the one in Kimberly, Wisconsin. The town the company is named for.
Miles: What did Wall Street say?
Nora: The business press called it stupid. Wall Street analysts downgraded the stock. Collins is very specific that this was the consensus view. The quiet lawyer with cancer had just bet the company on a fight with the biggest consumer goods company on earth.
Miles: And twenty years later.
Nora: Over Smith's twenty years in charge, by Collins's count, the stock returned about four times the general market. Twenty five years on, Kimberly Clark is the leading consumer paper company in the world. It has beaten Procter and Gamble in six of eight product categories. It owns Scott Paper, its old rival, outright.
Miles: And Smith?
Nora: Smith, when someone asked him later how he did it, said he never stopped trying to become qualified for the job.
Miles: That's a very different kind of answer.
Nora: It's the whole point of the book. Collins tried to leave the chief executives out, and kept finding Darwin Smiths.
Miles: Before we get into the ideas, tell me about the man who wrote this.
Nora: Jim Collins. Born nineteen fifty eight, Colorado for most of his life. He studied mathematical sciences at Stanford, then did an MBA there. Short stints at McKinsey and at Hewlett Packard. Then back to Stanford's business school to teach, where he won a distinguished teaching award. And in nineteen ninety five he leaves the university and sets up what he calls a management laboratory in Boulder. That's where the research teams work to this day.
Miles: And this wasn't his first book.
Nora: No. His first big one was Built to Last, with Jerry Porras, in nineteen ninety four. That book studied companies that had been excellent for generations. And there's a dinner story here that I love. A McKinsey partner named Bill Meehan takes Collins out and tells him, more or less, your book is useless.
Miles: Useless?
Nora: Because every company in it was great from the beginning. So it tells you nothing if you're running a merely good company and want to become great. And Collins takes the insult seriously. That challenge becomes Good to Great.
Miles: How did he go about it?
Nora: Five years. A rotating team of roughly twenty researchers. They screen fourteen hundred and thirty five companies that had appeared on the Fortune five hundred, looking for a very specific pattern. Fifteen years of stock returns at or below the market. A transition point. And then fifteen years of returns at least three times the market.
Miles: And how many made it?
Nora: Eleven. Abbott, Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Gillette, Kimberly Clark, Kroger, Nucor, Philip Morris, Pitney Bowes, Walgreens, and Wells Fargo. Each one paired with a comparison company in the same industry that had the same shot and didn't make the leap.
Miles: I want you to remember that list, because we're coming back to it.
Nora: We are. The book comes out in two thousand one and becomes one of the best selling business books ever. He follows it with How the Mighty Fall in two thousand nine, Great by Choice with Morten Hansen in two thousand eleven, and a short monograph called Turning the Flywheel in two thousand nineteen. And the human detail: he's a serious rock climber, has been for decades, and he talks about climbing exactly the way he talks about companies. Preparation, discipline, a long series of small moves.
Miles: Okay. The ideas. Collins builds the book as seven concepts.
Nora: Seven, and they stack in order. The first is Level Five Leadership, and that's the Darwin Smith idea. Collins told his team to downplay the leaders at the top. Level Five found them anyway, and it wasn't charisma. Modest, sometimes shy people, who were at the same time ferociously determined. He calls it a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will.
Miles: What does that look like day to day?
Nora: They channel ambition into the company, not into themselves. They give credit out the window and take blame in the mirror. And they set their successors up to succeed rather than to look small by comparison. The comparison companies, meanwhile, tended to hire celebrated outsiders. The company did well while the star was there and fell apart when the star left.
Miles: Number two.
Nora: First Who, Then What. This is the bus. The good to great leaders didn't start with a vision and then recruit people to it. They got the right people on the bus, the wrong people off, the right people in the right seats, and only then decided where to drive.
Miles: Why that order?
Nora: Two reasons. With the right people, the problem of motivating and managing mostly disappears. And when the world changes, the right people can change direction with you. There are two rules that come out of it. When in doubt, don't hire, keep looking. And when you know you need to make a people change, act. He's careful about the words. Rigorous, not ruthless. They didn't churn people. They also didn't let a wrong fit sit for years.
Miles: Three.
Nora: Confront the Brutal Facts. The great companies faced reality without flinching, and they built a climate where the truth could be heard. He gives four practices. Lead with questions, not answers. Engage in debate, not coercion. Conduct autopsies without blame. And build what he calls red flag mechanisms, ways of turning information into information you can't ignore.
Miles: This is the chapter with the admiral.
Nora: The Stockdale Paradox. Jim Stockdale was a prisoner of war in Vietnam for eight years and was tortured repeatedly. Collins asks him who didn't make it out. And Stockdale says, the optimists.
Miles: The optimists?
Nora: The ones who said, we'll be out by Christmas. Then Easter. Then Thanksgiving. And, in his words, they died of a broken heart. Stockdale's own stance was to hold two things at once. Absolute faith that he'd prevail in the end. And the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of his current reality, whatever they were. Collins argues that dual stance is what let the great companies make hard decisions without losing hope.
Miles: Four.
Nora: The Hedgehog Concept. Borrowed from an Isaiah Berlin essay. The fox knows many things. The hedgehog knows one big thing. The great companies were hedgehogs. Each found one simple organizing idea at the intersection of three circles. What they could be the best in the world at. What drove their economic engine. And what they were deeply passionate about.
Miles: Give me the example.
Nora: Walgreens. It decided it could be the best in the world at convenient drugstores. It measured itself on profit per customer visit instead of profit per store. And it cared about that. It sounds trivial until you notice how many companies chase things they're merely good at. And Collins is emphatic that a hedgehog concept isn't a goal and not a strategy. It's an understanding, and it usually takes years of iterating to find.
Miles: Five.
Nora: A Culture of Discipline. Disciplined people, disciplined thought, disciplined action. The great companies gave people freedom and responsibility inside a clear framework and then trusted them. Nucor, the steel company, is the example. People worked hard because the system rewarded it and carried no passengers. And there's this odd image that readers never forget. The triathlete Dave Scott, who was said to rinse his cottage cheese to get the last bit of fat off.
Miles: He rinsed his cottage cheese.
Nora: It's Collins's picture of someone doing the small disciplined thing nobody else bothers with. The flip side of this chapter is the stop doing list. The great companies were as clear about what they wouldn't do as about what they would.
Miles: Six.
Nora: Technology Accelerators. None of the eleven pioneered a technology. None of them made the leap because of one. What they did was ask whether a technology fit their hedgehog concept. If it did, they became pioneers in applying it. If not, they ignored it. Walgreens built a serious web presence, but only after it worked out how the web served convenient drugstores, while a heavily funded online rival lost most of its market value. Technology accelerates momentum. It doesn't create it.
Miles: Right.
Miles: And seven.
Nora: The Flywheel. Picture a huge, heavy metal disk on an axle. You push, and it barely moves. You push again, same direction. Eventually it turns once. Then twice. Then faster, until its own weight is doing the work. Collins says that's what every transition looked like from inside. No single defining moment. No launch. Outsiders saw a breakthrough. Insiders saw years of consistent pushes.
Miles: And the opposite.
Nora: He calls it the Doom Loop. The comparison companies lurched. New program, new acquisition, new savior, each push in a new direction, so no momentum ever built.
Miles: So here's where I push back. Remember the list.
Nora: Circuit City.
Miles: Yeah. Circuit City.
Nora: Bankrupt in two thousand eight. Liquidated the next year. Fannie Mae went into government conservatorship in September of two thousand eight, after an accounting scandal earlier that decade. And Wells Fargo, which the book holds up for its culture of discipline, became infamous in two thousand sixteen for opening millions of unauthorized customer accounts.
Miles: What does Collins say to that?
Nora: In How the Mighty Fall, he argues companies decline when they stop practicing the principles, not because the principles are wrong. And there's something to it. But notice what it does to the framework. If a company succeeds, it proves the model. If it fails, it abandoned the model. That's hard to falsify.
Miles: And there's a deeper critique.
Nora: Phil Rosenzweig, two thousand seven, a book called The Halo Effect. His argument is that Collins picked his companies on the outcome, great stock performance, and then went looking for what they had in common. That's a classic research error. And worse, the evidence, the interviews and the press coverage, is contaminated by the halo. When a company is doing well, everyone remembers its leaders as humble and its culture as disciplined. When it stumbles, the same people remember arrogance and drift.
Miles: So the data may be describing how success gets narrated.
Nora: Rather than what causes it. Which doesn't make the book useless. It makes it a very well organized checklist of things that plausibly help. Not a proven causal law. And that's the right tier for this whole shelf. Practitioner literature. Widely read. Highly quotable. Not peer reviewed evidence.
Miles: Okay. Now the reason this show exists. Let me say the summary again, and then turn it. For a neurodivergent chief executive, or one leading neurodivergent people, Good to Great reads as a case for building a company around structure instead of charisma. Quiet leadership over performance. The right people in seats built around them. Brutal facts said out loud and heard without punishment. One narrow focus. And a flywheel that keeps turning on the days when nobody's attention or energy is at full strength.
Nora: And a flag before we start. This is coaching judgment applied to practitioner material. It's a way to talk, not a research finding. And profiles vary. What follows is about tendencies, not about any one person.
Miles: Understood. And I want to do this in three passes. ADHD first. Then autism. Then the leader who has both, because that's a different conversation.
Nora: It is.
Miles: So. A chief executive with ADHD reads Good to Great. Which chapters should sting?
Nora: The Hedgehog and the Flywheel, and they sting for the same reason. ADHD in a leader often shows up as a pull toward the new. New market, new product, new hire, new tool. Each one is exciting, and each one is a push in a new direction. Collins has a name for that.
Miles: The Doom Loop.
Nora: Yeah. The Doom Loop. So the Hedgehog Concept becomes a guardrail rather than a philosophy. Three circles. Can we be the best in the world at it. Does it drive the engine. Do we care. A leader with ADHD can run that check in thirty seconds on every shiny opportunity, and it gives them a way to say no that doesn't depend on willpower.
Miles: And the Flywheel.
Nora: The Flywheel is the answer to variable attention. If the company runs on the leader's focus, it'll have great weeks and lost weeks. So the coaching move is to build the wheel so it turns without the leader's daily push. Fixed cadences that happen whether or not anyone feels like it. Ownership delegated to people whose consistency is their strength. Scoreboards reviewed on a schedule, not on a mood. First Who, in the ADHD frame, means hiring for the traits you don't have, and then letting those people hold the rhythm.
Miles: What about Culture of Discipline? That word, discipline, lands hard on people with ADHD.
Nora: It does, and Collins's version is kinder than it sounds. Freedom and responsibility inside a clear framework. For an ADHD leader that's permission to build the framework once, outside their own head, and stop relying on self control. And the stop doing list is the best tool in the book for this profile. Three things we won't do this year, written down, visible.
Miles: And if a CEO with ADHD brings this book up?
Nora: Ask what their hedgehog is, and then ask what they said no to last quarter because of it. If they can't name a no, the book hasn't landed yet.
Miles: Second pass. Autism. Which chapters?
Nora: Level Five and Brutal Facts. Start with Level Five. Collins's great leaders were quiet, didn't self promote, and were ferociously determined. Many autistic leaders fit that description without trying. The will is there. The mission focus is there. What's often missing is the performance of confidence that boards and investors expect.
Miles: Which is the Darwin Smith problem.
Nora: Exactly the Darwin Smith problem. Read as unqualified because they don't present the way a leader is supposed to present. So the coaching move is to separate self promotion from will, and make the ambition for the institution visible in ways that don't require performing. Written strategy. Consistent decisions. Letting results and the right people speak.
Miles: Mm-hm.
Miles: Brutal Facts.
Nora: This is where autistic leaders, and autistic staff, earn their keep and get punished for it at the same time. Directness delivers the brutal fact. The question is whether the room can receive it. And Collins's four practices, lead with questions, debate without coercion, autopsies without blame, red flag mechanisms, read like a description of a workplace where a blunt, accurate person can survive. If a leader loves this chapter, they've agreed in principle that being right and being socially smooth are different skills.
Miles: The Hedgehog, for autism.
Nora: Often already there. There's a theory in the autism literature called monotropism, Dinah Murray and colleagues, two thousand five, describing attention pulled tightly into a small number of deep interests. That's a hedgehog by temperament. So the coaching question flips. Not, can you focus, but has the economic circle been checked. Deep focus on something the market won't pay for is a hobby, not a company.
Miles: And First Who?
Nora: Two things. Standard interviews tend to screen out autistic talent, because they test social fluency rather than the job. So when a chief executive says they only put the right people on the bus, ask how they decide. And the seats matter more than Collins lets on. There's a research thread on job crafting, begun by Amy Wrzesniewski and Jane Dutton in two thousand one with a theory paper. Later meta-analyses of the correlations tie some kinds of role reshaping to better performance and slightly lower intent to leave. Fitting the seat to the person is the point, not a favor.
Miles: Culture of Discipline, for this profile.
Nora: The accommodation model, quietly. Explicit expectations, clear structure, then real autonomy over how the work gets done. The difference from the ADHD pass is emphasis. For ADHD, the framework holds the leader steady. For autism, the framework makes the unwritten rules written.
Miles: Third pass. The leader who has both.
Nora: This is a different conversation, because the two pulls point in opposite directions. The autistic pull is toward depth. One thing, done completely. The ADHD pull is toward the new. A leader with both can lurch, and then hyperfocus on the thing they lurched to. From the outside that looks inconsistent, and boards tend to read inconsistency as a character flaw rather than a wiring pattern.
Miles: So how does the book help?
Nora: The Hedgehog becomes the tiebreaker. When the two pulls disagree, the three circles decide, not the mood of the week. The Flywheel has to be built by other people, because this leader will be brilliant at the push and unreliable at the cadence. And Level Five gives them a story for the board. Quiet, determined, erratic in direction until the hedgehog is set, then relentless. That's a pattern a board can understand if someone names it.
Miles: One caution before we close this out.
Nora: None of this is a diagnosis and none of it describes any one person. It's a way of listening. When a leader tells you which chapter of this book they underlined, you're learning something about how they work, and these three passes give you a place to start.
Miles: So the recap, in that frame. Build the company around structure, not charisma. Put people in seats that fit them. Make it safe to say the true thing. Pick one thing, and let it be the tiebreaker. And push in the same direction until the wheel carries the weight, so no single person's hardest day can stop it.
Miles: Last piece. Where does artificial intelligence fit in all of this?
Nora: Collins already wrote the rule. Technology accelerates momentum. It doesn't create it. A company with no hedgehog and no discipline will use AI to lurch faster. A company with both will use it to push the flywheel harder.
Miles: Be concrete. In the neurodivergent space, what does that look like?
Nora: The uses are already visible and they line up with the book. Meeting transcription and summary takes the load off working memory and auditory processing, so a person can stay in the conversation instead of scrambling to take notes. That's First Who: it keeps a capable person effective in their seat. Task decomposition, turning a big ambiguous goal into a sequenced list with time estimates, is an executive function support a leader with ADHD can run on their own calendar. Drafting and tone checking works both ways. It softens a blunt message when softness is needed, and it lets someone who overthinks every email send one in five minutes.
Miles: And the brutal facts?
Nora: Two things. Rehearsing a hard conversation with an AI, before the real one, is a cheap way to prepare. And AI analysis of the company's own numbers can surface an uncomfortable trend without anyone having to be the messenger. That lowers the social cost of a red flag mechanism.
Miles: Give me the cautions.
Nora: Two. First, the evidence that AI tools improve outcomes for neurodivergent workers is early. Mostly practitioner reports and small studies. Promising practice, not established. Second, the Doom Loop applies to tools, and these particular tools change under you faster than anything Collins studied. A new AI product every quarter is lurching. The disciplined version is Collins's own. Pick the one tool that fits the hedgehog. Use it seriously for six months. Then measure whether the wheel turned.
Miles: That's Good to Great.
Miles: Next time: Atomic Habits, by James Clear, which takes Collins's flywheel and shrinks it down to one person, one day at a time.
Nora: Small pushes, same direction. Collins would recognize it.
Miles: Nora, thank you.
Nora: Of course. Thank you, Miles.
Miles: See you tomorrow.
Miles: Sixty Books is produced by Stoar Consulting and Coaching. Logan Williamson is a Licensed Professional Counselor in Texas and Louisiana. What you just heard is education about a book, for leaders and teams. It isn't coaching, it isn't counseling, and none of it is an opinion about you.
Nora: The sources for every claim we made are on the episode page, next to the transcript. There's a new book tomorrow.
Miles: Miles and Nora are synthetic voices. Not people, not licensed, and nothing either of us said was about you. These scripts are written with AI assistance and are edited and approved by Logan Williamson, a Licensed Professional Counselor in Texas and Louisiana, at Stoar Consulting and Coaching.
Nora: And one note about the AI segment. The evidence that these tools help neurodivergent people at work is early. There are controlled trials now, but they measure things like conversation skill rather than how a job actually goes, and for work itself most of what exists is individual providers reporting success. So take it as promising and not proven. The tools also get rebuilt every few months, so whatever you set up today is built on something that moves.
Sources
The claims in this episode, in the order they come up, with where each comes from. These were sourced after the episode was published, and a claim we could not trace to a source is left off rather than guessed at. 34 claims. Studies in psychology and medicine were checked on PubMed; everything else against the publisher, the paper or the original record.
See the sources
In 1971 Kimberly-Clark named Darwin Smith, the company's in-house lawyer, as chief executive.
Collins, J. (2001). "Level 5 Leadership: The Triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve." Harvard Business Review, 79(1), 66-76. Copy hosted by the NHS Leadership Academy: https://content.leadershipacademy.nhs.uk/aspce3/files/Jim_Collins_Level_5_Leadership.pdf . Describes Smith as "the company's mild-mannered in-house lawyer," named chief executive in 1971.
Collins, J. (2001). Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap... and Others Don't. HarperBusiness. ISBN 9780066620992. Chapter 2 opens with the same story.
Good to Great sold millions of copies.
Collins, J., biography, https://www.jimcollins.com/pdf/JimCollins_Biography.pdf : the book "has sold 3 million hardcover copies since publication."
Good to Great, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_to_Great : four million copies; published 16 October 2001.
Kimberly-Clark's traditional core business was coated paper, and its stock had fallen 36 percent behind the general market over the previous twenty years.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "a stodgy old paper company whose stock had fallen 36% behind the general market during the previous 20 years"; "the traditional core business, coated paper, was doomed to mediocrity" (dash in the original replaced here).
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 2, gives the same 36 percent figure.
Smith grew up on an Indiana farm and put himself through night school at Indiana University while working days at International Harvester. Soon after his appointment a director told him he lacked some of the qualifications for the job.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: Smith "grew up on an Indiana farm and put himself through night school at Indiana University," working the day shift at International Harvester; a director "reminded him that he lacked some of the qualifications for the position."
Two months after he became chief executive, doctors diagnosed nose and throat cancer and gave him less than a year to live. He told the board he had no plans to die soon, kept working, commuted weekly from Wisconsin to Houston for radiation, and lived 25 more years.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "two months after Smith became CEO, doctors diagnosed him with nose and throat cancer and told him he had less than a year to live"; he "had no plans to die anytime soon"; weekly travel from Wisconsin to Houston for radiation; "He lived 25 more years, 20 of them as CEO."
Smith concluded the coated paper business would stay mediocre, moved the company into consumer paper products against Procter and Gamble, and sold the mills, including the namesake mill in Kimberly, Wisconsin. The business press called the move stupid, and Wall Street analysts downgraded the stock.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "Smith announced that Kimberly-Clark would sell its mills, even the namesake mill in Kimberly, Wisconsin"; "The business media called the move stupid, and Wall Street analysts downgraded the stock" (dash in the original replaced here).
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 2, gives the same wording.
Over Smith's twenty years as chief executive, Kimberly-Clark's cumulative stock returns were 4.1 times the general market. Twenty five years after the move it owned Scott Paper outright, beat Procter and Gamble in six of eight product categories, and was, in Collins's words, the leading consumer paper products company in the world.
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 2: "Kimberly-Clark owned Scott Paper outright and beat Procter & Gamble in six of eight product categories"; during Smith's twenty years as chief executive the company "generated cumulative stock returns 4.1 times the general market."
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "Twenty-five years later, Kimberly-Clark owned Scott Paper and beat Procter & Gamble in six of eight product categories"; "the leading consumer paper products company in the world"; cumulative stock returns "4.1 times greater than those of the general market." Rechecked 2026-10-09.
Asked later how he did it, Smith said he never stopped trying to become qualified for the job.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "I never stopped trying to become qualified for the job."
Collins gave his research teams explicit instructions to downplay the role of top executives; in his words, the Level 5 finding emerged anyway.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "I gave the research teams explicit instructions to downplay the role of top executives in their analyses of this question"; "But Level 5 found us." Checked 2026-10-09.
Jim Collins was born on 25 January 1958 in Colorado and was raised there.
James C. Collins, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_C._Collins : born 25 January 1958, Aurora, Colorado.
Stanford Graduate School of Business alumni profile, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/alumni/news/catalyst/jim-collins-80-mba-83 : raised in Colorado.
Collins took a degree in mathematical sciences and an MBA at Stanford, worked for McKinsey and for Hewlett-Packard, taught at Stanford's business school, where he won the Distinguished Teaching Award, and in 1995 founded a management laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.
Stanford GSB alumni profile, as in item 10: bachelor's in mathematical sciences (1980), MBA (1983), later faculty member, Distinguished Teaching Award, management laboratory in Boulder in 1995.
His first major book was Built to Last, written with Jerry Porras and published in 1994.
James C. Collins, Wikipedia, as in item 10: Built to Last (1994), with Jerry I. Porras.
A McKinsey partner, Bill Meehan, told Collins over dinner that Built to Last was useless, because its companies had for the most part always been great; that challenge became the question of Good to Great.
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 1: Meehan, of McKinsey's San Francisco office, said "Unfortunately, it's useless," because the companies had, for the most part, always been great; Collins notes Meehan was exaggerating for effect and accepts the core point.
The research ran five years with a rotating team of about twenty. It screened 1,435 companies that had appeared on the Fortune 500 from 1965 to 1995, looking for fifteen years of cumulative stock returns at or below the general market, a transition point, then fifteen years of returns at least three times the market.
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 1: a "five-year research effort"; "twenty-one people worked on the project at key points, usually in teams of four to six at a time."
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: "We began with 1,435 companies that appeared on the Fortune 500 from 1965 to 1995"; returns "at or below the general stock market for 15 years," then "at least three times the market over the next 15 years."
The companies that met the test included Abbott, Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Gillette, Kimberly-Clark, Nucor, Philip Morris, Pitney Bowes, Walgreens and Wells Fargo, each paired with a comparison company in the same industry.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1, names Kimberly-Clark, Gillette, Abbott, Walgreens, Circuit City, Nucor and Philip Morris among the good to great companies.
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapters 1 to 3, names Fannie Mae, Wells Fargo and Pitney Bowes in the set, and Eckerd as the comparison company for Walgreens.
Good to Great came out in 2001. Collins followed it with How the Mighty Fall (2009), Great by Choice with Morten Hansen (2011) and the monograph Turning the Flywheel (2019).
Good to Great, Wikipedia, as in item 2: published 16 October 2001. Open Library record for ISBN 9780066620992: HarperBusiness, 2001.
Level Five leaders combine personal humility with professional will, a combination Collins calls paradoxical.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: a Level 5 leader "blends extreme personal humility with intense professional will"; "this paradoxical combination of traits."
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 2.
Level Five leaders give credit out the window and take blame in the mirror and set up their successors to succeed. In the comparison companies, executives more often set up successors to fail, large egos were common, and bringing in a high profile outside change agent was negatively correlated with a sustained transformation.
Collins (2001), HBR article, as in item 1: Level 5 leaders "look out the window to apportion credit" and "look in the mirror to assign responsibility"; they "routinely select superb successors"; in "more than three-quarters of the comparison companies" executives "set up their successors for failure, chose weak successors, or both"; "a gargantuan ego" in "more than two-thirds of the comparison companies."
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 2: "going for a high-profile outside change agent is negatively correlated with a sustained transformation from good to great."
First Who, Then What: get the right people on the bus and the wrong people off before deciding where to drive. Two of its rules are "When in doubt, don't hire, keep looking" and "When you know you need to make a people change, act," and the stance is rigorous, not ruthless.
Collins (2001), book, as in item 1, chapter 3: "get the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus"; "Practical Discipline #1: When in doubt, don't hire, keep looking"; "Practical Discipline #2: When you know you need to make a people change, act"; heading "Rigorous, not ruthless" (dashes in the original replaced here).
Confront the Brutal Facts sets out four practices: lead with questions, not answers; engage in dialogue and debate, not coercion; conduct autopsies without blame; build red flag mechanisms.
LitCharts, Good to Great chapter 4 summary, https://litcharts.com/lit/good-to-great/chapter-4 : the four practices as listed.
Jim Collins, "Confront the Brutal Facts," https://jimcollins.com/concepts/confront-the-brutal-facts.html , listing "Autopsies without Blame."
Jim Stockdale was a prisoner of war in Vietnam for eight years and was tortured repeatedly. He told Collins the prisoners who did not make it out were the optimists, who expected release by Christmas, then Easter, then Thanksgiving, and "died of a broken heart." His own stance was faith that he would prevail in the end together with the discipline to confront the brutal facts of his current reality.
Jim Collins, "The Stockdale Paradox," https://jimcollins.com/concepts/Stockdale-Concept.html : "tortured over twenty times during his eight-year imprisonment from 1965 to 1973"; the optimists "were the ones who said, 'We're going to be out by Christmas'," then Easter, then Thanksgiving; "they died of a broken heart"; "I never lost faith in the end of the story."
The Hedgehog Concept borrows from Isaiah Berlin: the fox knows many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing. It sits at the intersection of three circles: what you can be the best in the world at, what drives your economic engine, and what you care about most deeply. It is an understanding, not a goal, and the companies took years to find it.
Jim Collins, "The Hedgehog Concept," https://jimcollins.com/concepts/the-hedgehog-concept.html : Berlin's parable, "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing"; the three circles; "A Hedgehog Concept is not a goal to be the best," but "an understanding of what you can be the best at."
LitCharts, chapter 5 summary, https://litcharts.com/lit/good-to-great/chapter-5 : the companies generally needed "at least four years to clarify theirs."
A Culture of Discipline means freedom and responsibility within a clear framework. Nucor is one of the chapter's examples; the triathlete Dave Scott, a six time Hawaii Ironman winner, rinsed his cottage cheese to remove fat; and the chapter recommends a stop doing list.
LitCharts, Good to Great chapter 6 summary, https://litcharts.com/lit/good-to-great/chapter-6 : clear structures with discretion inside them; stop doing lists; companies discussed include Nucor, Abbott, Circuit City and Kimberly-Clark; the cottage cheese image.
Lawline, "Good to Great Pt. 2: Rinse your Cottage Cheese" (2 September 2010), https://culture.lawline.com/company-culture/rinsing-your-cottage-cheese : identifies the athlete as Dave Scott, six time Hawaii Ironman champion, citing Collins.
Technology Accelerators: the good to great companies became pioneers in applying technologies that fit their Hedgehog Concept, and technology alone did not create the results. Walgreens moved onto the web deliberately while a heavily valued online pharmacy lost most of its market value.
LitCharts, Good to Great chapter 7 summary, https://litcharts.com/lit/good-to-great/chapter-7 : the companies "often became pioneers in the use of technology" tied to their Hedgehog Concepts; "technology alone cannot create sustained great results"; Walgreens proceeded slowly online; the online pharmacy, highly valued at its 1999 public offering, lost most of its initial market value.
TechCrunch, 24 March 2011, https://techcrunch.com/2011/03/24/boom-walgreens-buys-online-retailer-drugstore-com-for-409-million : Walgreens agreed to acquire the online retailer drugstore.com "in a transaction with a total enterprise value of approximately $409 million."
The Flywheel: a heavy metal disk on an axle, pushed turn upon turn until momentum builds. Collins found no single defining action or miracle moment. The comparison companies fell into what he called the Doom Loop.
Jim Collins, "The Flywheel," https://jimcollins.com/concepts/the-flywheel.html : "a massive metal disk mounted horizontally on an axle"; "there is no single defining action, no grand program, no one killer innovation, no solitary lucky break, no miracle moment"; the comparison companies "fell instead into what we came to call the doom loop."
Circuit City filed for bankruptcy protection in November 2008 and announced in January 2009 that it would liquidate.
PC World report syndicated by ABC News, 16 January 2009, https://abcnews.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=6665263 : liquidation announced; "The company entered bankruptcy protection in November 2008."
Fannie Mae was found to have misapplied accounting rules in 2004, restated its results in 2006, and was placed into government conservatorship in September 2008.
Congressional Research Service, "Accounting Problems at Fannie Mae," RS21949, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS21949.html : regulator's findings made public 22 September 2004; SEC directed a restatement in December 2004; restatement issued 6 December 2006, reducing retained earnings by 6.3 billion dollars.
Federal Housing Finance Agency, statement of Director James B. Lockhart, 7 September 2008, https://www.fhfa.gov/news/statement/statement-of-fhfa-director-james-b.-lockhart-at-news-conference-announcing-conservatorship-of-fannie : Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed into conservatorship.
In September 2016 Wells Fargo was fined over the opening of accounts customers had not authorized, which the bank's own analysis put at more than two million.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, press release, 8 September 2016, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts/ : more than two million deposit and credit card accounts that "may not have been authorized by consumers"; combined penalties of 185 million dollars.
In How the Mighty Fall (2009) Collins argues that decline is largely self-inflicted and comes in stages, beginning with hubris and the undisciplined pursuit of more, and he names Circuit City and Fannie Mae among the fallen.
Collins, J. (2009). "How the Mighty Fall," https://www.jimcollins.com/books/how-the-mighty-fall.html : decline "largely self-inflicted"; five stages; "Taking action inconsistent with your core values is undisciplined"; Circuit City and Fannie Mae named as icons that fell.
Collins, J. (2009). How the Mighty Fall: And Why Some Companies Never Give In. HarperCollins.
Phil Rosenzweig's The Halo Effect (2007) argues that selecting companies on their outcome cannot reveal what made them great, and that retrospective interviews and press coverage carry the halo of performance: when results fall, the same leaders are suddenly described as arrogant.
Knowledge at Wharton, "The Halo Effect: Debunking Some Hot Business Books with One of His Own," 28 February 2007, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-halo-effect-debunking-some-hot-business-books-with-one-of-his-own/ : "If you start by selecting companies based on outcome"; interviews and business press "mainly catch the glow from the Halo Effect"; when results decline, "the company's leaders are suddenly seen as arrogant."
Rosenzweig, P. (2007). The Halo Effect... and the Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers. Free Press. ISBN 9780743291255.
Monotropism, set out by Dinah Murray and colleagues in 2005, describes attention concentrated into a small number of interests.
Murray, D., Lesser, M., & Lawson, W. (2005). Attention, monotropism and the diagnostic criteria for autism. Autism, 9(2), 139-156. PMID: 15857859. DOI: 10.1177/1362361305051398 . Checked on PubMed 2026-10-09.
Amy Wrzesniewski and Jane Dutton introduced the idea of job crafting in 2001: employees reshaping the task, relational and cognitive boundaries of their own jobs.
Wrzesniewski, A., & Dutton, J. E. (2001). Crafting a job: Revisioning employees as active crafters of their work. Academy of Management Review, 26(2), 179-201. DOI: 10.2307/259118 . Abstract via the SUFE academic newsletter record, https://academicnewsletter.sufe.edu.cn/info/367785 .
Later meta-analyses, which pool correlations from many workplace studies, associate some forms of job crafting, such as building up structural job resources, with better job performance and modestly lower turnover intentions. The associations are correlational and differ by form of crafting.
Rudolph, C. W., Katz, I. M., Lavigne, K. N., & Zacher, H. (2017). Job crafting: A meta-analysis of relationships with individual differences, job characteristics, and work outcomes. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 102, 112-138. DOI: 10.1016/j.jvb.2017.05.008 . Bibliographic record checked on Crossref 2026-10-09.
Quality Improvement Center for Workforce Development, "Umbrella Summary: Job Crafting" (August 2023), https://www.qic-wd.org/sites/default/files/Umbrella%20Summary%20-%20Job%20Crafting%20081823.pdf : summarizes Rudolph and colleagues (2017) and Boehnlein and Baum (2022, The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 33(4), 647-685); increasing structural resources is moderately related to performance and modestly to lower turnover intentions, and decreasing hindering demands is related to higher turnover intentions.
The next book is Atomic Habits by James Clear.
Clear, J. (2018). Atomic Habits. Avery. ISBN 9780735211292. Atomic Habits, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Habits : published 16 October 2018.